Reaganist Realism Comes to Detriot by Ross, Stephen F.
Penn State Law eLibrary
Journal Articles Faculty Works
1989
Reaganist Realism Comes to Detriot
Stephen F. Ross
Penn State Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/fac_works
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation




Four days before resigning under an ethical cloud in the midst of the
1988 presidential election campaign,' Attorney General Edwin Meese is-
sued a decision and order approving, pursuant to the Newspaper Preser-
vation Act,2 the Detroit Free Press's and the Detroit News's application
for permission to enter into a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA). The
agreement preserved editorial independence for the two newspapers but
effectively merged their business operations, thus ending economic com-
petition in the Detroit newspaper industry, the nation's fifth largest
newspaper market.3
Two years earlier, Douglas Ginsburg, then the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust Division, had concluded that the ap-
plicants had "not yet sustained their burden of proof of showing that the
Detroit Free Press is a 'failing newspaper' within the meaning of the
Act."4 Pursuant to Justice Department regulations,5 an expert adminis-
trative law judge was appointed to resolve the factual issues and to rec-
ommend a decision.6 The Antitrust Division appeared at the hearings in
opposition to the JOA.7 The Division opposed the JOA because the par-
ties had deliberately engaged in a strategy of accepting short-run finan-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois. A.B. 1976, J.D. 1979, University of Cali-
fornia (Berkeley). The author wishes to thank Kit Kinports and Charles Rothfeld for insightful com-
ments on an earlier draft and Karla Fischer for research assistance.
1. See Wash. Post, Aug. 12, 1988, at A12, cols. 1-5 (Meese resigned the same day that an
independent counsel had determined that he probably violated federal conflict of interest and tax
laws).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1982).
3. Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (D.C. Cir.),
aff'd per curiam, No. 88-1640 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1989) (lower court decision upheld by an equally
divided court). This case will be referred to as "Detroit Newspapers" throughout this article. Meese
denied that decisions by the Free Press and its sister newspaper, the Miami Herald, to pull critical
cartoons had any effect on his decision. Randolph, Detroit Papers Permitted to Publish Jointly,
Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 1, A4, cols. 1-5.
4. Detroit Newspapers, 868 F.2d at 1289.
5. See 28 C.F.R. § 48.10(a) (1988).
6. The judge was Morton Needelman, who had over 12 years experience as an Administrative
Law Judge for the Federal Trade Commission. See, e.g., In re The Elec. Bid Registration Serv. of
Memphis, Inc., 107 F.T.C. 240 (1986) (initial decision by Needelman, J.); In re Ligget & Myers Inc.,
87 F.T.C. 1074 (1976) (initial decision by Needelman, J.).
7. See Post-Hearing Brief of the Antitrust Division, In the Matter of: Application by Detroit
Free Press, Inc., and the Detroit News, Inc. for Approval of a Joint Operating Arrangement Pursu-
ant to the Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801, et seq. (Sept. 23, 1987) (No. 44-03-24-8)
[hereinafter Antitrust Division Brief].
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cial losses in return for the prospect of long-run monopoly profits. Each
newspaper hoped to realize monopoly profits after eliminating economic
competition in the Detroit newspaper market, through either the demise
of the other paper or an antitrust-exempt JOA.8  The judge recom-
mended that the Attorney General deny the application.9 Nevertheless,
Attorney General Meese approved the JOA after deliberating for eight
months. In approving the JOA Meese concluded that the papers' strategy
was legitimate, thus rejecting the advice of both his subordinate and an
independent reviewer who had strong expertise in antitrust law.1 °
In Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Thornburgh (De-
troit Newspapers),"' a group of consumers, advertisers, and newspaper
employees sought judicial review of the Attorney General's decision. I2 A
divided court of appeals sustained the decision,13 and the Supreme Court
affirmed the appeals court by a 4-4 vote.1 4 In sustaining Meese's deci-
sion, Judge Laurence Silberman's majority opinion relied almost exclu-
sively on the principle of deference to administrative interpretations of
statutes.1 5 Judge Silberman's reliance on the deference principle was so
complete that he ignored or rejected every other potential tool of statu-
tory construction that judges might be expected to use in this context.
Indeed, use of any of these commonly used tools of statutory interpreta-
tion would suggest that Attorney General Meese's construction of the
Act was incorrect.
Judge Silberman's decision is one of a number of opinions written by
Reagan judicial appointees that, in at least three important areas, frus-
trate congressional policy judgments in favor of executive or judicial pol-
icy or value judgments. First, as exemplified by Detroit Newspapers, an
administrator's decision effectively trumps traditional judicial techniques
used to determine congressional intent in enacting a statute. Second, sev-
eral Reagan judicial appointees have written decisions decrying the use of
various indicia of congressional intent to interpret statutes, preferring in-
stead to rely on the "plain meaning" of the statute. 6 However, in most
8. Id. at 27-29.
9. Detroit Newspapers, 868 F.2d at 1289.
10. Id. at 1291 (quoting Attorney General's opinion noting that "newspapers cannot be faulted
for considering and acting upon an alternative that Congress had created").
11. 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.), aff'dper curiam, No. 88-1640 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1989).
12. The plaintiffs alleged that the decision violated both the Newspaper Preservation Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1982) and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982), because,
inter alia, it was arbitrary and capricious and otherwise in violation of law. 868 F.2d at 1287.
13. Judge Lawrence Silberman wrote the panel opinion, which was joined by Judge Spott-
swood Robinson III. Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 1286. A petition for rehearing
en banc was denied by the entire court over the dissents of Judges Patricia Wald, Harry Edwards,
Abner Mikva, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Id. at 1301.
14. No. 88-1640 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1989).
15. 868 F.2d at 1291 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
16. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2574-77 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. & O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Immigration
& Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1224 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in
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controversial cases a judge's determination of the statute's "plain mean-
ing" will turn on the judge's individual background and policy prefer-
ences.' 7 By ignoring indicia of actual legislative intent in favor of a
meaning based on a judge's inevitably personal reading of the words of a
statute, the judiciary inevitably tilts the process of interpretation in favor
of its preferences and away from the legislature's.
Finally, one of President Reagan's three Supreme Court nominees,
Justice Antonin Scalia, has forcefully expressed the view that the consti-
tutionally mandated doctrine of separation of powers prevents Congress
from restraining executive branch action in a number of ways.18 The
political effect of Scalia's view is to impede advancement of congressional
policy preferences where they conflict with those of the President.
Of course, academics and judges of various political perspectives
have put forth sound arguments in support of deference to administrative
interpretations of statutes, increased emphasis on statutory language at
the expense of legislative history, and a strict wall of separation between
the branches of the federal government.' 9  It is somewhat disturbing,
however, that conservative Republican judges are promoting these doc-
trines at a time when the Republican party controls the presidency, Re-
publican appointees increasingly dominate the federal bench,2° the
Democrats control Congress, and political prognosticators predict that
this stand-off is likely to continue.2 This trend toward frustration of
congressional policy preferences is even more troubling when one consid-
ers that a hypothetical conservative unaware of the current partisan
make-up of the three branches of government probably would oppose
deference to administrative agencies, would be skeptical of giving judges
the power to construe statutes based on their own values instead of the
intent of Congress, and would prefer governmental procedures that
check the power and intrusiveness of executive branch regulation.
Therefore, although many reasonable and nonpartisan lawyers, judges,
or scholars may sincerely believe in each or all of these three trends, one
the judgment); Trustees of Iron Workers Local 473 Pension Trust v. Allied Prods. Corp., 872 F.2d
208, 213 & n.9 (7th Cir. 1989) (Manion, J.); Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Easterbrook, J.); Homer v. Acosta, 803 F.2d 687, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Archer, J.); Wallace v.
Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559-60 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the judgment);
Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., con-
curring); Payne v. Federal Land Bank, 711 F. Supp. 851, 857-59 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (Voorhees, J.).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 119-40.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 143-47.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 159-61.
20. Based on a recent listing of the federal judiciary, courts of appeals judges nominated by
Republican Presidents outnumber those nominated by Democratic Presidents by a margin of 97-60.
Nominees of Republican Presidents constitute a majority of active judges in every circuit except the
Ninth (12 Carter appointees, I Kennedy appointee, 10 Reagan appointees, and 2 Nixon appointees)
and the Eleventh (6 Carter appointees, I Nixon appointee, 3 Ford appointees, and 2 Reagan appoin-
tees). See Judges of the Federal Courts, 703 F. Supp. vii-xxxii (1989).
21. See Broder, A Troubling Agenda From Carter and Ford, Wash. Post, Nov. 27, 1988, at D7,
col. 5 ("voters have institutionalized a new set of checks and balances between a near-permanent
Democratic Congress and a near-permanent Republican presidency").
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explanation for their current ascendancy is their effect of elevating Re-
publican policy preferences over Democratic ones. Before judges with a
less partisan orientation follow these trends, they should pause to con-
sider their impact on the separation of powers in an era when different
parties control different branches of government.
Part I of this article discusses Detroit Newspapers and explains how
in deferring to the Attorney General's interpretation of the Newspaper
Preservation Act, Judge Silberman disregarded every applicable tech-
nique of statutory interpretation typically used to resolve the issue. In-
deed, each of these techniques suggests that Meese's interpretation of the
Act was incorrect. This part of the article also demonstrates why defer-
ence to Attorney General Meese was particularly inappropriate in light
of the generally accepted justifications for judicial deference to adminis-
trative interpretations of statutes.
Part II explains that Detroit Newspapers is one of several opinions by
conservative Reagan judicial appointees that rely on techniques that have
the foreseeable effect of obstructing congressional policy preferences.
Specifically, opinions that defer to administrative interpretations, use
"plain meaning" instead of other indicia of legislative intent, and impose
constitutional limits on Congress's ability to delegate policy decisions to
nonexecutive branch officials all result in aiding Republicans who now
control the presidency and who predominate in the judiciary. This bene-
fit to the Republicans comes at the expense of a Democratic controlled
Congress.
Finally, Part III argues that conservatives who did not know that
liberal Democrats controlled the Congress and that conservative Repub-
licans controlled the Presidency and much of the federal judiciary would
not prefer deference to administrators, reliance on "plain meaning," or
constitutional straitjackets on congressional oversight of executive
branch regulators. Indeed, such persons could be expected to reach the
opposite result if blinded to the partisan realities of the post-Reagan era.
I. THE DETROIT NEWSPAPERS CASE: DEFERENCE IN THE EXTREME
Detroit Newspapers ultimately involved a question of statutory inter-
pretation of the Newspaper Preservation Act,22 even though the plaintiffs
framed the case as one requiring judicial review of the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision approving the JOA under the Administrative Procedure
Act.23 Attorney General Meese approved the JOA based on his finding,
as required by the Newspaper Preservation Act, that the Free Press was a
"failing newspaper." The Act defines a "failing newspaper" as one that,
"regardless of its ownership or affiliations, is in probable danger of finan-
cial failure."'
24
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1982).
23. See supra note 12.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1802(5) (1982).
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In all prior executive and judicial interpretations of the Act, the al-
legedly failing newspaper was caught in a downward spiral of reduced
circulation, followed by reduced advertising, followed by reduced circu-
lation, and so forth.2 5 This situation usually occurred because the rele-
vant market could no longer support two major metropolitan daily
newspapers.26 In Detroit Newspapers, however, the administrative law
judge found, and Attorney General Meese did not dispute, that Detroit
could support two dailies and that neither paper had begun to suffer the
downward spiral that so often leads to a newspaper's demise. 27 Rather,
each newspaper was suffering financial losses because they were engaged
in a fierce battle and each was pricing subscriptions and advertising at
money-losing rates. The battle was designed so that if either lost too
much money without prevailing over the other, they could seek a lawful,
competition-ending agreement which would be exempt from the antitrust
laws. The remaining entity would then enjoy the economic advantages of
a monopolist. The case raised the statutory question of whether a news-
paper suffering losses because of such strategic behavior 28 is "in probable
danger of financial failure." In upholding the Attorney General's inter-
pretation and concluding that the Free Press came within the Act's defi-
nition of a "failing newspaper," the court of appeals correctly found that
neither the plain meaning of the statute nor any evidence of specific legis-
lative intent answered this question. The majority seriously erred,
though, in choosing to defer to Attorney General Meese's interpretation
of the statute while eschewing other major tools of statutory construc-
tion, all of which suggest that the Meese interpretation is incorrect.
25. Detroit Newspapers, 868 F.2d at 1292.
26. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 1788 (1970) (statement of Sen. Fong) (it is "increasingly difficult
for many newspapers to coexist in the same community under conditions of all-out economic compe-
tition"). Senator Fong was a cosponsor of the Newspaper Preservation Act and a member of the
Antitrust and Monopolies Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary.
27. Decision and Order, In the Matter of; Application by Detroit Free Press, Inc., and The
Detroit News, Inc., for Approval of a Joint Newspaper Operating Arrangement Pursuant to the
Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801, et seq., No. 88-303, at 6, 9 n.3 (Aug. 8, 1988)
(Docket No. 44-03-24-8) [hereinafter Meese Decision]. See also Report of the Assistant Attorney
General in Charge of the Antitrust Division, In the Matter of: Application by Detroit Free Press,
Inc., and The Detroit News, Inc., for Approval by the Attorney General of a Joint Operating Ar-
rangement Pursuant to the Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801, et seq., at 3 (July 23,
1986) (Public File No. 44-03-24-8) [hereinafter AAG Report]. (Free Press never had less than 49%
of total daily circulation in prior 10 years and had generally shown improvement in circulation.) The
Free Press's percentage of total circulation varied from 49.0% to 49.9% during the 1980-85 period.
Id. In terms of both the amount and revenue generated from advertising, competition had also
remained constant. Id. at 34.
28. In calculating the profitability of any action, behavior is strategic when firms not only
consider the direct effects of their own conduct, but also the indirect profit effects that result from
the reactions of others. See Ordover & Wall, Proving Predation After Monfort and Matsushita:
What the "New Learning" Has to Offer, ANTITRUST, Summer 1987, at 5, 6. In this context, newspa-
pers behave strategically when they consider the expected responses of both their rivals and the
Justice Department, acting under the Newspaper Preservation Act, in deciding whether to engage in
or continue a price war that results in short-term losses.
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A. Plain Meaning and Specific Legislative Intent
There is no dispute that the two primary tools of statutory construc-
tion-the "plain meaning" of the statute's words and specific legislative
intent about the question at issue--do not resolve Detroit Newspapers.
The term "probable danger of financial failure" could plausibly allow the
Attorney General to approve the JOA based on his factual finding that
without the JOA, the Free Press would probably fold.29 On the other
hand, because a change in managerial tactics could reverse both newspa-
pers' financial losses, the term could also plausibly be construed so as to
exclude a newspaper losing money solely because of an artificially gener-
ated and maintained below-cost bidding war. Indeed, the one other ap-
pellate decision interpreting the Act held that where financial losses were
due to correctable managerial problems, the paper would not be consid-
ered in "probable danger of financial failure."3
Likewise, review of other relevant provisions in the statute does not
assist in resolving the issue. The Act's stated purpose is to permit JOAs
when "effected in accordance with the provisions of this chapter."3
Prior to passage of the Act, the Supreme Court had interpreted the Sher-
man Act in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States32 as requiring JOA
participants to show that bankruptcy was imminent. The Act was in-
tended to alter the status quo by imposing a more lenient standard for
approving JOAs than would be applicable generally to failing companies
under the Sherman Act.33 On the other hand, the Act's inclusion of a
special standard ("not likely to remain or become financially sound") for
JOAs in existence at the time the Act was being considered34 shows that
Congress intended the phrase "probable danger of financial failure" to be
construed more strictly.
Even within these boundaries, the proper result in Detroit Newspa-
pers is not apparent. As Judge Silberman noted, the more lenient stan-
dard applicable to existing JOAs could mean that such JOAs could
continue in effect if either newspaper was unable to realize a profit suffi-
cient to generate a reasonable return on investment.35 The Detroit pa-
pers could easily satisfy a stricter standard because both were actually
suffering monetary losses. At the same time the plaintiffs could argue
that the Act merely meant to impose a looser standard than Citizen Pub-
lishing's requirement of imminent bankruptcy. A standard that necessi-
tated a finding that the weaker newspaper had begun to suffer a "decline
29. See Meese Decision, supra note 27, at 10, 1 1.
30. Committee for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d 467, 478-79 (9th Cir. 1983).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (1982).
32. 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
33. See H.R. REP. No. 1193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3547 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]; S. REP. No. 535, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969)
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (1982).
35. 868 F.2d at 1295.
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in a pattern that will ultimately force it out of business" absent a JOA36
could not be met by the Detroit papers. Yet this standard would be a
more permissive standard than Citizen Publishing's requirement that the
paper have neared the end of the downward cycle of lost circulation and
advertising and was facing imminent bankruptcy.
Neither the opinions nor the briefs cite any evidence that Congress
considered this specific problem in enacting the Newspaper Preservation
Act.37 The only legislative history cited by the court of appeals is the
fact that the phrase "probable danger of financial failure" was borrowed
from the Bank Merger Act."8 The Bank Merger Act's legislative history
does indicate that a bank does not meet this standard when its financial
losses are due to "managerial deficiencies. '"" But there is no suggestion
by the court .or the litigants that Congress, in deliberating on either stat-
ute, considered whether strategic behavior of the kind engaged in by the
warring Detroit newspapers could be considered a "managerial
deficiency."
B. Other Interpretive Tools
A variety of other interpretive tools remain for a court to employ
once it finds that neither the "plain meaning" nor specific evidence of
legislative intent determines the issue of how a court is to interpret a
statute. Techniques used by courts to resolve issues of statutory con-
struction include: the application of well-understood canons of construc-
tion; an inquiry into which interpretation is most consistent with
Congress's purpose in enacting the statute; an imaginative reconstruction
of how Congress would have decided this issue if members had thought
about it; a narrow construction based on separation of powers concerns;
or a broad dynamic interpretation based on the court's view of how the
statute can best further desirable policy in today's world.
Judge Silberman refused to employ any of these techniques. Rather,
36. Brief for Appellants at 21, Detroit Newspapers (No. 88-5286) (emphasis added).
37. Congress did recognize the need for JOAs where "vigorous competition resulted in finan-
cial difficulty." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 3. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 3
(Act intended to cover newspapers "under competitive pressure"); 116 CONG. REC. 1788 (1970)
(statement of Sen. Fong) (noting that it was increasingly difficult "for many newspapers to coexist in
the same community under conditions of all-out economic competition"). But the difficulty Con-
gress envisioned occurred where market changes made it difficult for two major metropolitan dailies
to exist, or where competition had given one paper such a dominant position that the weaker paper
was unlikely to be able to continue to operate without a JOA. See Newspaper Preservation Act,
Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 279 and
Related Bills, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1969) (written statement of bill's authors) [hereinafter
House Hearings]. There is no suggestion that Congress envisioned a situation involving a market
capable of supporting two dailies, where neither one had achieved dominance, and where the paper
with fewer resources for a predatory war of attrition would be considered in "probable danger of
financial failure."
38. 868 F.2d at 1291 (citing a floor statement by the bill's House floor manager, Rep. Kas-
tenmeier, 116 CONG. REC. 23,146 (1970), referencing the Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(3)
(1982)).
39. 868 F.2d at 1291-92 (citing United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 190 (1968)).
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once he was "unable to discern a specific congressional intent governing
this case," Judge Silberman removed his interpretive hat and deferred to
the Attorney General's interpretation.' He chose a particularly bad case
to allow an administrative interpretation to trump any judicial effort at
statutory construction because, as demonstrated below, every seemingly
relevant tool of statutory construction that judges would otherwise use
suggests that the Attorney General's interpretation was wrong.
1. Narrowly Construing Antitrust Exemptions
Both Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in dissent, and the Ninth Circuit,
in another case construing the Act, concluded that the Act should be
read in light of the long-standing interpretive canon that antitrust exemp-
tions are to be narrowly construed.4" Judge Silberman's refusal to apply
this canon was unfortunate because the canon reflects both, as a descrip-
tive matter, what Congress probably means when it enacts antitrust ex-
emptions, and, as a normative matter, how courts should construe
ambiguous language in an exempting statute.
Antitrust exemptions generally originate in the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees.42 Most members of these committees are attor-
neys43 who are well aware of the long-standing Supreme Court prece-
dents holding that exempting statutes are to be narrowly constructed.
Lobbyists and committee staff involved in drafting the statutes are also
well aware of these precedents. With this knowledge, both the advocates
and opponents of a proposed antitrust exception rely on the doctrine of
narrow construction in debating and compromising on the statutory lan-
guage used in creating the new exemption."
Normative considerations also support the practice of narrowly con-
struing antitrust exemptions. The antitrust laws are intended to protect
consumers at large,45 while exemptions generally benefit a small group of
owners in a specific industry. In the newspaper context the competition
40. 868 F.2d at 1291 (emphasis added). Cf Committee for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704
F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1983) (deferring when administrative construction is "consistent with the
intent of Congress").
41. See Detroit Newspapers, 868 F.2d at 1299-1300; Hearst, 704 F.2d at 478 (both opinions
citing Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979)).
42. See Senate Rule 25.1(k) 16; House Rule X, cl. 1(m).
43. Mikva & Lundy, The 91st Congress and the Constitution, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 449, 462-63
(1971).
44. My own experience as a minority staff counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee from
1983-85 confirms this practice. During that period, the Committee reported legislation exempting
certain research and development joint ventures from treble damage liability. See S. REP. No. 427,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3105. Both the industry
supporters seeking a broad exemption and those opposed to such protection were well aware of the
"law" in this area and relied on our expectation that the courts would construe the statute narrowly
in carefully drafting the definition of a "joint research and development venture" that would qualify
for the bill's protection. See id. at 9, 12-13.
45. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (the antitrust laws are Congress's
"consumer welfare prescription"); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).
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mandated by the antitrust laws primarily inures to the benefit of the hun-
dreds of thousands of subscribers and daily purchasers of metropolitan
newspapers, as well as the many local and national firms that pay for
newspaper advertising. The principal beneficiaries of the Newspaper
Preservation Act's antitrust exemption are the shareholders of the com-
panies owning major metropolitan dailies. Public choice theory suggests
that the latter group will be more effective in lobbying Congress to gain
exemptions. The shareholder group is smaller and more easily organ-
ized, and each individual member has more to gain from the exemption
than each individual reader or advertiser has to lose.46 The result may be
exemptions that do not truly reflect majority will or the public interest.47
Therefore, where a special interest group has negotiated a deal with key
legislators, that group should bear the full costs of ensuring that the deal
is explicitly set forth in a statute.4  There is no reason to give special
interest groups, who already have advantages that may allow them to
prevail at the expense of the public interest, any additional benefits. Nar-
rowly construing antitrust exemptions is thus consistent with Madison's
goal that the Constitution limit the ability of interest groups (factions) to
achieve antimajoritarian outcomes in the legislature.49
Applying this canon suggests that Attorney General Meese incor-
rectly interpreted the Newspaper Preservation Act. Congress clearly did
not intend to apply the "probable danger of financial failure" standard to
firms suffering financial losses due to "managerial deficiencies.""o Thus
narrow construction of "probable danger of financial failure" leads to the
conclusion that the phrase does not apply to newspapers suffering finan-
cial losses only because they are pursuing predatory"' strategies with the
46. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). See generally W. ESKRIDGE
& P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 48-56 (1988).
47. See, e.g., W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 46, at 48-49 (citing M.
SCHAITSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 34-35 (1960)).
48. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An In-
terest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 238, 251-56 (1986).
49. Id. at 243 (citing Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
39-40 (1985)).
50. See supra text accompanying note 30. The Attorney General's decision at times appears to
imply that the JOA should be approved because there had been no "managerial deficiencies" on the
part of the Free Press; rather, the News's decision to continue the price war left the Free Press no
alternative but to cease operations or enter a JOA. Meese Decision, supra note 27, at 12, 15. A
narrow construction of the exemption created by the Newspaper Preservation Act would not give
such a limited interpretation to "managerial deficiencies." As three court of appeals judges dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en banc noted, "the economic behavior on which the Attorney Gen-
eral's grant of immunity rests comes perilously close if it does not actually constitute a practice
inimical to the purpose of the antitrust laws." Detroit Newspapers, 868 F.2d at 1305 (Wald, C.J.,
Mikva, Edwards, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (footnote and internal quotation
omitted).
5 1. The Antitrust Division found that the Free Press's clear goal was to achieve dominance in
Detroit, even at the cost of short-term profitability. AAG Report, supra note 27, at 45. Sacrificing
short-term profits in anticipation of a greater long-term return from the monopoly profits that mar-
ket dominance will bring is the essence of predation. See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 113 (1977)
("the characteristic feature of [predation] is that the predator is acting in a way which will not
No. 2]
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knowledge that victory is inevitable, either from monopolization or from
a "self-serving, competition-quieting arrangement.
'5 2
2. Purposive Interpretation
One of the oldest and most venerable rules of statutory interpreta-
tion is to construe a statute in light of its intended purpose.53 English
courts used this guideline as early as 1584,"4 reasoning that a judge's task
maximize present or foreseeable future profits unless it drives or keeps others out or forces them to
tread softly"). Cf. AAG Report, supra note 27, at 46 ("eventually dominance would mean that the
Free Press would have pricing power in the Detroit market, whether the News left the market,
remained as a second paper that was not a significant economic threat, or agreed to the formation of
a JOA"). The Free Press's incentive to predate was aided by its serious overestimation of losses
suffered by the rival News and by its recognition that the financial resources of the Knight-Ridder
chain, which owned the Free Press, significantly exceeded those of the News prior to the latter's
purchase by the Gannett chain. See id. at 59.
The Administrative Law Judge reached the same conclusion. He found that the operating
losses suffered by both Detroit newspapers were "attributable to the same causes," which he identi-
fied as an effort "by a deep-pocketed chain to achieve market domination and future profitability at
the cost of current profits." Administrative Law Judge Morton Needelman's Recommended Deci-
sion, In the Matter of: Application by Detroit Free Press Inc., and The Detroit News, Inc., for
Approval of a Joint Operating Arrangement Pursuant to the Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1801, et seq., at 114 (Dec. 29, 1987) (Docket No. 44-03-24-8) [hereinafter ALJ Decision].
52. 868 F.2d at 1299 (R.B. Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Brief of Appellee The Detroit
Free Press, Inc. at 45 n.*, Detroit Newspapers (No. 88-5286) (Free Press's strategy to achieve domi-
nance was not inconsistent with future negotiations to obtain a JOA because greater success at domi-
nance strategy would only enhance favorable JOA negotiations).
Judge Silberman distinguished the practice of narrowly constructing antitrust exemptions from
other interpretive canons that might illustrate a "specific intent" on Congress's part to exclude the
Detroit Newspaper situation from the scope of firms in "probable danger of financial failure." 868
F.2d at 1292-93. He noted, for example, that a congressional ban on imported apples, oranges, and
bananas could be construed, using the canon of expresio unius est exclusio alterius, to indicate no
congressional intent to ban imported grapefruit, and implied that courts should so hold even if an
administrator construed the statute to cover a grapefruit ban. Id. at 1293.
Although this distinction among canons may draw support from some language in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984), it ultimately
remains unpersuasive. The expresio unius canon has some descriptive validity in ascertaining con-
gressional intent, not because members of Congress actually think this way, National Petroleum
Refiners Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1973), but because members
and their staffs are so familiar with that canon that a judge can safely assume that they would realize
that failing to include grapefruits in the list of the enumerated banned fruits would lead a court to
apply the canon to exclude grapefruit. Similarly, judges should assume that the canon calling for
narrow construction of antitrust exemptions is sufficiently well-known to members and their drafting
assistants to justify a finding that Congress had a "specific intent" that courts narrowly construe the
phrase "probable danger of financial failure."
Judge Silberman's refusal to consider the canon of narrow construction of antitrust exemptions
is also inconsistent with Supreme Court decisions both before and after Chevron that reversed agency
determinations in light of accepted canons. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Car-
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (agency decision rejected because, inter alia, of canon that
ambiguities in deportation statutes should be construed in favor of alien); Federal Maritime Comm'n
v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973) (agency construction of Shipping Act rejected based
on canon of narrowly construing antitrust exemptions).
53. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 87 (1975).
54. Heydon's Case, 30 Co. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Exch. 1584) (after determining the
"mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide," courts are to discern the "true
reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as
shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, . .. according to the true intent of the makers
of the Act, pro bono publico.") (emphasis in original).
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when interpreting a statute was to give effect to the intent of the legisla-
ture.5 In 1899, the United States Supreme Court recognized that "the
well-settled" general rule for construing ambiguous statutes called for a
judicial inquiry into "the reasons which induced" the statute, "the mis-
chiefs intended to be remedied," and "the purpose intended to be accom-
plished" by the statute.56 Where statutory language is ambiguous, one
would expect an interpreter attempting to carry out the intent of the en-
acting legislature to construe the statute in the manner most consistent
with the statute's overall purpose. Indeed, the Supreme Court has made
clear that a court is not to "stand aside and rubber-stamp" an agency
decision that would "frustrate the congressional policy underlying the
statute."
57
As with most statutes, the Newspaper Preservation Act reflects a
balance of legislative concerns. Congress was clearly unhappy with the
strict failing-company standard the Supreme Court had established in the
Citizen Publishing case.5" By the time a paper's financial condition dete-
riorated to the extent that it would pass the Court's standard of immi-
nent bankruptcy, Congress feared, the newspaper would be "virtually
beyond salvage," and thus of little value as an acquisition or a joint ar-
rangement partner.59 The result-the end of both editorial and eco-
nomic competition-was precisely what Congress was determined to
avoid.' At the same time, however, the standard applicable to proposed
JOAs was clearly intended to be "far more stringent" than the lenient
test adopted for existing JOAs. 6 ' The "probable danger of financial fail-
ure" standard was to be "limited only to those situations where a joint
newspaper operating arrangement is demonstrably essential to prevent a
55. Id.
56. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 419 (1899); see also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426, 433 (1964) (inferring private cause of action as necessary to effectuate legislative purpose).
57. National Labor Relations Bd. v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965). This authority, or a
variation on it emphasizing that agencies can depart from neither the letter nor spirit of the act, has
also been noted in Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464
U.S. 89, 98 (1983); Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 454 U.S. 404,
418 (1982); Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32-
33 (1981); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1978); National Labor Rela-
tions Bd. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 267-68 (1975); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 746 (1973); Volkswagenwerk AG v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S.
261, 272 (1968). See also Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157, 166-68 (1971) (NLRB decision rejected as contrary to congressional purpose as expressed in
legislative history).
58. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 10; SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 4.
59. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 4; 116 CONG. REC. 23,168 (1970) (statement
of Rep. Annunzio).
60. "The Court failed to articulate a doctrine which recognized the fundamental importance of
placing a failing newspaper on a sound financial basis in order to preserve these two voices before
there is a grave possibility of failure." 116 CONG. REC. 1786 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Bennett)
(emphasis added).
61. See Committee for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d 467, 474 (9th Cir. 1983);
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 18; 116 CONG. REC. 23,146 (1970) (statement of Rep. Kas-
tenmeier); id. at 23,154-55 (statement of Rep. Railsback).
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newspaper failure."62 In adopting a "probable danger" standard with a
"bite,"' 63 Congress's obvious purpose was to preserve editorial competi-
tion between newspapers where economic competition was no longer fea-
sible, but to retain both editorial and economic competition where both
were still realistic possibilities.' 4
Judge Silberman incorrectly saw a tension in Detroit Newspapers be-
tween the "pro-consumer direction of the antitrust laws" and a "congres-
sional desire . . . that diverse editorial voices be preserved despite the
unique economics of the newspaper industry., 65  As Judge Silberman
noted, Congress thought the economics of the newspaper industry were
unique in that a downward spiral would be inevitable once the weaker of
two competing papers began to lose circulation.66 Congress also saw a
special public interest in preserving editorial independence for two news-
papers even if they were no longer economic rivals.67  No tension be-
tween these two purposes arises when newspapers are suffering
strategically induced losses. The pro-consumer direction of the antitrust
laws generally points, of course, to denying JOA applications. The spe-
cial concern about preserving potentially failing newspapers before they
62. 116 CONG. REC. 23,148 (1970) (statement of Rep. McCulloch). Representative McCulloch
was the ranking Republican on the House Judiciary Committee. When the chairman or his desig-
nated floor manager joins forces with the ranking minority member of a committee, it becomes very
difficult for any other senator or representative to break up the committee consensus. See A. MIKVA
& P. SARIS, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: THE FIRST BRANCH 151-52 (1983). Because of his pivotal
role in the winning coalition, Representative McCulloch's views should be entitled to great weight in
reviewing the legislative history.
63. See Detroit Newspapers, 868 F.2d at 1299 (R.B. Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64. Attorney General Meese overruled his administrative law judge's prediction that, should
the JOA be denied, the News would respond by ending below-cost pricing, resulting in the profitable
operation of both newspapers. Meese thus concluded that economic competition was not a realistic
possibility. The Attorney General's determination was based on testimony by executives of the News
and its parent company, Gannett, that they would continue to pursue below-cost pricing until they
dominated the Detroit market. Meese Decision, supra note 27, at 9, 15.
The Attorney General's decision was legally incorrect under a purposive interpretation. The
congressional intent to preserve editorial and economic competition where possible is ill-served by a
policy that permits a dominant firm with a deep pocket to outlast its weaker rival in a price war in
order to achieve a JOA. The decision was probably incorrect factually as well, and raises a distinct
irony about the Reagan administration's antitrust policy. Reagan antitrust officials often considered
the work of Robert Bork and other like-minded scholars to be economic gospel. Nonetheless, the
Attorney General credited the unsupported assertions of Gannett and News executives that they
would continue below-cost pricing even though these scholars' works suggest that, absent the pros-
pects of a JOA, such conduct makes no economic sense. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARA-
DOX 149-55 (1978); Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 268 (1981); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289, 292-94 (1980).
-65. 868 F.2d at 1293.
66. Id. at 1288. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 37, at 10-11 (written joint statement of
bill's sponsors); 116 CONG. REC. 1788 (1970) (statement of Sen. Fong) (quoting Honolulu newspaper
publisher's testimony that newspapers are "peculiarly different from most other businesses" because
of downward spiral). Even under the more lenient test initially adopted by the Senate for all JOAs
("appears unlikely to remain or become a financially sound publication"), Congress's intent was to
adopt a standard that was "able to recognize the trend toward failure and not be required to wait
until it is irreversible" because "continued life of a newspaper cannot be achieved by requiring an
exhaustion of all available resources before the failing company doctrine is deemed applicable." See
SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 4; 116 CONG. REC. 1786-87 (1970) (statement of Sen. Bennett).
67. House Hearings, supra note 37, at 9-10.
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fall irretrievably into a "downward spiral" is not present when neither
newspaper is in a downward spiral.68 The congressional desire to pre-
serve both economic and editorial competition where possible is thus best
served by interpreting the phrase "probable danger of financial failure"
to exclude those newspapers whose losses are strategically induced.69
3. Imaginative Reconstruction
Judge Silberman cannot be faulted for failing to adhere to a "purpo-
sive" approach to statutory construction. The "purposive" approach has
attracted a number of critics.7° According to law and economics legis-
prudence, any attempt to ascribe an overriding "public purpose" to legis-
lation enacted by a majority of 535 members of Congress makes little
sense.7 For example, Judge Richard Posner has argued that, like com-
mercial contracts, legislation represents a bargain and compromise be-
tween competing interests. Like contracts, therefore, statutes should be
construed to give effect to the bargain, but no further. Thus, interpreting
courts should not extend a statute to cover something within its "spirit,"
but rather should "imaginatively reconstruct" what members of the en-
acting Congress would have done, if they had thought about the issue not
actually considered, when enacting the statute.72 Judges should study
not only the language and structure of the statute, but also its history and
the values and attitudes of the period when the legislation was enacted.73
An imaginative reconstruction of the Newspaper Preservation Act
suggests that an otherwise healthy newspaper in a market capable of sup-
porting two dailies should not be considered in "probable danger of fi-
nancial failure" when its losses are attributable to strategic behavior.
The prime concern of lobbyists supporting the Act was to preserve ex-
isting JOAs whose status was threatened by the Supreme Court's Citizen
Publishing decision. 74 It is important to note that, under Citizen Publish-
68. Far from being in a downward spiral, the Free Press's losses have been attributed to its
"clear goal" of achieving "dominance in the Detroit newspaper battle, even at the cost of short-term
profitability." AAG Report, supra note 27, at 45.
69. Cf Committee for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst, 704 F.2d 467, 478 (9th Cir. 1983) (interpreting
Newspaper Preservation Act "to prevent newspapers from allowing or encouraging financial difficul-
ties in the hope of reaping long-term financial gains through a JOA").
70. See Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process
Era, 48 U. PIrr. L. REV. 691, 701-25 (1987); see also Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp.,
474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986) in which Burger, C.J. stated:
Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out some vague social or economic evil;
however, because its Members may differ sharply on the means for effectuating that intent, the
final language of the legislation may reflect hard fought compromises. Invocation of the "plain
purpose" of legislation at the expense of the terms of the statute itself takes no account of the
processes of compromise and, in the end, prevents the effectuation of congressional intent.
71. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 289-90 (1985).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 287.
74. The only witnesses who appeared before the House Antitrust Subcommittee during the
1969 hearings in support of the Newspaper Preservation Act, aside from public officials and wit-
nesses who testified as individuals expressing their own personal opinions, represented interests con-
cerned with existing JOAs. See House Hearings, supra note 37, at 75 (testimony of Morris J. Levin
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ing, a paper could not enter into a JOA unless bankruptcy was imminent,
even if an inevitable downward spiral had begun or the market clearly
could no longer support two newspapers.
To ensure strong bipartisan support for the Act, its proponents fre-
quently emphasized the "limited" nature of the exemption the statute
would create.75 For example, the ranking Republican on the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee observed that the Attorney General's approval of
JOAs was made part of the process in order "to act as a brake upon other
newspapers which might otherwise prematurely turn to joint operating
arrangements, without testing other means of maintaining full commer-
cial and editorial competition."76 A key Republican member of the
House Judiciary Committee likewise noted that the bill reported by the
Committee (which generally reflected the final product77) was a "sub-
stantial improvement" over earlier proposals because, inter alia, the
"prospective availability of the exemption has been sharply restricted" by
requiring prior approval of the Attorney General "and by circumscribing
his power to consent through the use of a strict definition of failing news-
paper. '"78 Congress saw JOAs as necessary evils to preserve the desired
editorial competition between newspapers. These legislators would likely
not have permitted JOAs that ended economic competition if the cessa-
tion of strategic behavior would make a JOA unnecessary.
Although the Act sparked some private opposition from the AFL-
on behalf of virtually all newspapers with existing JOAs); id. at 404 (testimony of Roy C. Kruse of
the Hawaii Newspaper Guild, on behalf of the existing JOA between two Honolulu newspapers).
75. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 4; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 3 (uses "lim-
ited" in 3 of 5 objectives); 116 CONG. REc. 23,146 (1970) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier, who was
the bill's floor manager) ("not a great exemption from the antitrust laws but one that is relatively
modest and has been limited during the course of congressional action"); id. at 1787 (statement of
cosponsor Sen. Fong) ("limited exemption from certain features of our antitrust laws is carefully
circumscribed and restricted").
76. 116 CONG. REC. 2006 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska).
As noted above, Congress clearly borrowed the "probable danger of financial failure" standard
from the Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1982), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 2;
116 CONG. REc. 23,146 (1970) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). In Third Nat'l Bank, the Court
noted that bank mergers should not be approved where "the loss of competition could be avoided
and the convenience and needs of the community benefited in ways short of merger but within the
competence of reasonably able businessmen." 390 U.S. at 189. Because cessation of strategic behav-
ior is within the competence of the owners of the two rival Detroit papers, this JOA would appar-
ently flunk the Third Nat'l Bank test.
77. The House Judiciary Committee's substitute text for H.R. 279, as originally introduced,
was adopted after consideration by the Committee of the Whole House. 116 CONG. REC. 23,179
(1970). The Committee of the Whole House rejected all but one minor amendment to the Judiciary
Committee's proposal. Id. at 23,172-79. Upon passage of H.R. 279, the House then amended the
text of S. 1520, previously passed by the Senate, id. at 2018, by striking out the Senate version and
inserting in lieu thereof the text of H.R. 279. Id. at 23,180. The Senate subsequently concurred in
the House amendment to S. 1520. Id. at 24,435.
78. 116 CONG. REC. 23,154 (1970) (statement of Rep. Railsback) (emphasis added). The views
of Representative Railsback are significant because, as he notes, no JOAs were in effect in his district
and he had originally entertained reservations about the legislation, id., and because he authored the
amendment in committee to impose the stricter "probable danger of financial failure" standard on
postlegislation JOA applicants. See id. at 23,146 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
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CIO 79 and some suburban newspapers," most of the major metropolitan
dailies were strongly in favor of the bill."1 If Congress--or major in-
dependent newspapers supporting the bill through their trade associa-
tion-had foreseen the possibility that the Act could be invoked on
behalf of a powerful chain that was able to generate strategic losses for
itself or its rival, this unified special interest lobbying group would likely
have begun to factionalize as independently-owned papers questioned
whether they could compete against a chain-owned rival.82 To the extent
Congress thought about the possibility of newspapers engaging in preda-
tory behavior, it acted to prohibit such misconduct. Congress provided
that when this behavior occurs after the approval of a JOA, it is not
exempt from the antitrust laws.8 3 This provision was intended to "allay
fears expressed that the bill would help strong newspapers gobble up
weaker ones."8 4 This provision suggests that Congress would have re-
acted with disfavor had it considered the potential for predatory prac-
tices occurring before formation of a JOA.
4. Strict Statutory Construction
Another scholar of legisprudence, Judge Frank Easterbrook, has
criticized both the purposive and imaginative reconstruction approaches
to statutory interpretation, arguing that all statutes should be narrowly
construed unless they clearly authorize a broad judicial interpretation. 5
79. House Hearings, supra note 37, at 417 (testimony of AFL-CIO Assoc. Gen. Counsel
Thomas E. Harris).
80. Id. at 515 (testimony of Paul Conrad of National Newspaper Ass'n).
81. Among those testifying in support of the legislation was counsel for the American Newspa-
per Publishers Association, representing 90% of the daily newspaper circulation in the United
States. The Newspaper Preservation Act: Hearings on S. 1520 before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158-64 (1969) (testimony of
Arthur B. Hanson).
82. The fear that Meese's decision would invite newspaper chains to embark on this strategy
led the Arkansas Democrat, a Little Rock daily that competes with the Gannett-owned Arkansas
Gazette, to file an amicus brief with the court of appeals seeking a reversal of the Attorney General's
decision. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Little Rock Newspapers, Inc., In Support of Appellants at 2-4,
13-16 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (No. 88-5286). Indeed, the Democrat alleged that six days after Meese's
approval of the Detroit JOA, Gannett reduced subscription rates in Little Rock by 57.5% in an act
of predation. Id. at 15.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1803(c) (1982).
84. 116 CONG. REC. 1789 (1970) (statement of Sen. Fong).
85. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544-45 (1983) [hereinafter Eas-
terbrook/Chicago]. As Judge Easterbrook notes, id. at 545 & n. 15, his thesis really expands to all
statutes the "clear statement" rule that courts have traditionally applied in requiring clear congres-
sional intent in specific instances. See, e.g., United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 80-81
(1982) (absent clear statement, statutes will not be construed to have retroactive effect); Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1981) (absent clear statement, federal stat-
utes will not be construed to impose significant financial obligations on states or to constitute con-
gressional authority to enforce the 14th amendment); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 265
(absent clear statement, Sherman Act would not be construed to permit award of damages for harm
to the general economy of a state).
Judge Easterbrook's thesis is based on several normative arguments in favor of narrow con-
struction, including its superiority to purposive interpretation because legislatures, as multimember
bodies, are incapable of having a collective "intent," Easterbrook/Chicago, supra at 547, because
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Easterbrook contends that the principles underlying the constitutional
requirements that two houses of Congress enact legislation and the Presi-
dent must sign the legislation reflect a deliberate constitutional bias to-
ward the status quo-legislation must pass through a number of difficult
hurdles before it can have legal effect.6 Where a statute does not clearly
apply to a given case, it should not be applied, Easterbrook argues, lest
the courts, through the interpretive process, give effect to "bargains" for
which there was never a constitutionally-required consensus.8 7
Under this theory, the Newspaper Preservation Act would not per-
mit the JOA application in Detroit Newspapers. Both houses of Congress
passed the Sherman and Clayton Acts and the President signed the acts
into law. Both acts would prohibit the proposed agreement to end eco-
nomic competition between two rivals in Detroit. There was no clear
agreement between the House, the Senate, and the President on the ques-
tion whether newspapers suffering strategically induced financial losses
should be allowed to enter into a JOA. To give them this benefit would
improperly allow the Detroit papers to achieve an exemption from the
status quo without achieving the constitutionally required consensus.
5. Dynamic Interpretation
The purposive approach to interpretation has also received criticism
from those who believe it is too static.8 Advocates of the "dynamic in-
terpretation" of statutes agree with the law and economics critics that
divining the "purpose" of a statute is often difficult and probably inaccu-
allowing a previous legislature's purpose to govern today's problems improperly extends the domain
of a now-adjourned body, id. at 548-49, and because narrow construction is more consistent with
laissez faire principles that, in Judge Easterbrook's view, underlie our political order, id. at 549-50.
In contrast, the three clear statement rules enunciated by the Supreme Court and cited by Easter-
brook all can be justified by a totally different rationale-as a descriptive matter, they represent the
Court's best guess as to what Congress probably intended in enacting the legislation. This distinc-
tion between normative and descriptive canons of construction is, unfortunately, all too often ig-
nored.
In another work, Judge Easterbrook offers another mode of statutory construction, applying his
clear statement principle only to special interest statutes. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983
Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-15 (1984). His
conclusion about the Newspaper Preservation Act would doubtless be the same under either stan-
dard, however, for it clearly represents special interest legislation.
86. Easterbrook/Chicago, supra note 85, at 539.
87. Id. at 540-41.
88. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 20 (1988); Es-
kridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). For two examples of
judicial dissatisfaction with a static approach to statutory interpretation, see Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 92 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (refusing to join either Justice Brennan's majority opin-
ion or Justice Rehnquist's dissent, both of which focused on state of common law in 1871 in deter-
mining availability of punitive damages in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), and opining that
such damages should not be available because of their chilling effect on public officials' discharge of
their duties); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(privately agreed upon voluntary affirmative action plan is reasonable solution to problem, probably




rate. 9 Observing that statutes can reflect special interest bargains, dy-
namic interpreters argue that judges should construe ambiguous
statutory provisions to best effectuate today's public purposes, recogniz-
ing that Congress is free to modify the judicial interpretation if it so
desires.9°
Recent work by political scientists and economists supports dy-
namic interpretation. Changes in social views, technology, or congres-
sional and presidential political shifts can alter current officials' policy
preferences. Yet special interests, or views dominant in only one house
or branch of government, can block any new legislation.9 Dynamic stat-
utory construction may actually result in a more accurate reflection of
the policy preferences of currently elected officials and the general public
than does a system that requires courts to construe statutes in light of
outdated preferences that a minority can preserve through legislative
inaction.
A dynamic construction of the Newspaper Preservation Act would
construe "probable danger of financial failure" to exclude newspapers
suffering strategically induced financial losses. A dynamic interpreter
would reason that the antitrust laws should generally apply to the news-
paper industry for the same reasons they apply elsewhere: to protect
consumers (both businesses who advertise in newspapers and readers
who subscribe to them) from monopolistic exploitation and to promote
efficient allocation of resources. 92 Legitimate socio-political reasons ex-
ist, however, to prefer two editorially independent newspapers even
where two economically independent newspapers apparently cannot sur-
vive. Our society prefers editorial independence. Although we might be
willing to take a chance on bankruptcy before sanctioning mergers or
cartels in other industries, we are unwilling to take that risk in the news-
paper industry on the slim chance that either the failing firm will right
itself or an independent buyer will appear on the scene.
The dynamic interpreter would recognize that Detroit Newspapers
raises a different issue. As posed by Antitrust Division Chief Douglas
Ginsburg, "[w]hen a newspaper owner consciously and deliberately de-
cides to sacrifice short-term profits in a quest for greater long-term prof-
its, indeed potential monopoly profits,93 should a JOA be available as a
89. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 88, at 1511-12.
90. Id. at 1529-33; see also R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE ch. 9 (1986).
91. See, e.g., R. Gely & P. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of the Supreme Court (1989)
(unpublished working paper, Univ. of Illinois). The ability of one group to block new legislation and
thereby upset what may be the public interest, the will of the majority, or both, is graphically de-
scribed in McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 435-40 (1989) [hereinafter
McCubbins/Noll].
92. Lande, supra note 45.
93. Gannett Newspapers, the owners of the Detroit News, and Knight-Ridder, owner of the
Detroit Free Press, projected that by its fifth year the JOA would result in at least $88 million in
profits for each paper. Financial analysts predict that approval of the JOA will result in an increased
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'second-best' alternative?"94  It is difficult to see the public interest in
rewarding managerial strategies that allow firms to ruin themselves and
then seek protection. Indeed, the Attorney General's interpretation
would allow a wealthy newspaper chain to obtain a competition-ending
JOA at will. The wealthy chain could acquire one of two rival newspa-
pers, launch a price war, and then ask the Justice Department for a
JOA.95 Thus, although Congress did not recognize this problem when
drafting the "probable danger of financial failure" standard, our current
concerns with promoting competition and preserving editorial voices are
best accommodated by concluding that firms suffering strategically in-
duced losses do not meet the standard.
In affirming Attorney General Meese's interpretation of the News-
paper Preservation Act, Judge Silberman's opinion ignores all these in-
terpretive tools and rests solely on one rationale-deference to an
executive interpretation of the statute. The Judge's singular reliance on
that rationale is easily explained, for application of other major interpre-
tive tools, whose advocates span the entire spectrum of legisprudence,
would have required the opposite result. The question remains whether
the argument for deference is so strong in this case that it should trump
all these other means of statutory construction.
C. Is Deference Appropriate Here?
The deference courts often give to an agency's construction of a stat-
ute is supported by a number of considerations. In cases where these
considerations make a strong case for deference, deciding whether an
agency's interpretation should "trump" all other interpretive tools might
be difficult. In deciding Detroit Newspapers, however, the court of ap-
peals did not have to resolve this difficult question because the strongest
arguments that support judicial deference to an agency's statutory con-
struction are inapplicable to Attorney General Meese's decision to ap-
prove the JOA in Detroit Newspapers.
A persuasive functional argument in favor of deference relies on an
agency's expertise with respect to statutes with which it works daily.
The agency is more familiar than generalist judges with the specific stat-
ute, its relationship with other similar statutes, and the consequences of
particular interpretations.96 Unless the Attorney General happened to
bring to the job a particular background in antitrust or newspaper law,
value for both newspapers by $2.6 billion. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1988, at Dl, D26, col. 6 (citation
added).
94. AAG Report, supra note 27, Executive Summary at 6-7.
95. See supra note 82.
96. See, e.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933); Diver,
Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 589-90 (1985). As
Dean Diver notes, the agency will typically bear a significant portion of the costs of disruption
caused by an ill-fitting policy. Id. at 590. For example, in the wake of the Meese decision that firms
suffering losses due to strategic behavior are in "probable danger of financial failure," the Antitrust
Division must continue to enforce the Bank Merger Act.
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however, the bizarre structure of Justice Department decision making
robs the Attorney General of any claim to such expertise.
The Department's Antitrust Division is responsible for enforcing the
antitrust laws against newspapers, and for preliminarily evaluating JOA
applications. Where the Division opposes a JOA and a formal hearing is
scheduled, however, the Division becomes an adversarial party and,
under the Department's rules, is precluded from advising the Attorney
General except through formal proceedings.97 Although the hearing of-
ficer is usually an administrative law judge with substantial antitrust ex-
perience, a" the Attorney General's decision whether to approve or
disapprove the officer's recommendation is not based on any advice from
internal experts. Unless some Justice Department attorney outside the
Antitrust Division fortuitously has special expertise in this area, no basis
exists for believing that the Attorney General understands the impact his
decision will have on other cases99 or the relationship between his inter-
pretation of the particular statute and other statutes. In short, there is no
reason to believe that Edwin Meese's interpretation is superior, by any
standard, to that of the combined efforts of Judges Laurence Silberman,
Spottswood Robinson III, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Where the agency has a consistent and long-standing construction
of a statute, several additional factors support deferring to the agency.
Private parties may and should be able to rely on administrative interpre-
tations in planning their activities, and considerations similar to those
underlying the doctrine of stare decisis support stability in the law.
Moreover, Congress is probably aware of long-standing interpretations.
Although legislative inaction is generally not a sound basis for conclud-
ing that Congress supports the administrative construction, °0 at least
Congress has had the opportunity to consider the interpretation. Finally,
administrations of both political parties are likely to have preserved long-
standing interpretations, and thus such interpretations are less likely to
reflect a partisan policy preference that probably could not have pre-
vailed in Congress.
None of these considerations supports deference in Detroit Newspa-
pers. This was a case of first impression; no prior Attorney General had.
ruled on the particular issue.' O' Thus, the newspaper industry had no
97. 28 C.F.R. § 48.10(b) (1988) (Antitrust Division appears as party before administrative law
judge); id. § 48.12 (barring ex parte communications with administrative law judge or Attorney
General).
98. See supra note 6.
99. See supra note 96.
100. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940). The ease with which minori-
ties can block legislation by, for example, securing opposition of a committee chair or a bare majority
of a single subcommittee or through engineering dilatory tactics in the Senate supports exercising
caution in reading anything into legislative inaction. The courts have not been consistent in their
approach to this issue. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600-01 (1983). See
generally Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67 (1988).
101. Antitrust Division Brief, supra note 7, at 2.
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long-standing interpretations to rely on, and Congress had little opportu-
nity to review the interpretation. Moreover, an administration that had
"revolutionized" traditional enforcement of the antitrust laws, 10 2 often in
opposition to congressional policy preferences, 0 3 made the decision.
Another situation calling for deference to an agency is when the
time lapse between passage of the statute and the agency's interpretation
is short. " In such cases, the administrator was probably actively in-
volved in the legislative process and familiar with both the formal and
informal agreements that led to the statute's enactment. Other political
actors would see any deviation from these understandings coming so
soon after the statute's passage as a betrayal. Agency heads would be
loath to risk political and budgetary retribution possibly resulting from
such a breach of trust. The Newspaper Preservation Act, however, was
passed eighteen years prior to Attorney General Meese's decision in De-
troit Newspapers, and Meese had no role in its passage.
Finally, Judge Silberman relied heavily on the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 105
Chevron suggests that deference is appropriate where Congress con-
sciously desires that an agency reach a reasonable accommodation
among competing interests, either because Congress recognizes that the
agency has superior expertise in the area, or because neither side pre-
vailed in the congressional deliberations and both chose to "take their
chances" on the agency's decision."0 6 In both cases, judicial deference to
the agency fulfills congressional intent. Indeed, under these circum-
stances the agency is not really "interpreting" the statute and thus
resolving a legal issue the way a court would, but rather is determining
congressionally delegated policy matters."17
The legislative history indicates that neither of these two scenarios
102. See Anderson, Rewriting Antitrust Rules, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29, 1983, at 50.
103. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-180, § 605, 99 Stat. 1169-70 (1986) (expressing sense of
Congress that Justice Department's Vertical Restraint Guidelines were contrary to existing law and
congressional intent and therefore should be withdrawn); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-166, § 510, 97
Stat. 1102 (1984) (barring Justice Department from using appropriated funds to advocate judicial
overruling of strict rule prohibiting vertical price fixing); VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELINES RES-
OLUTION, H.R. REP. No. 399, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (explaining congressional responses to
Reagan administration's antitrust policy).
104. As Dean Diver notes:
Agency decisionmakers often have direct knowledge of the circumstances surrounding enact-
ment of the statutes that they administer. Such knowledge may be derived from personal par-
ticipation in that process or from close and frequent contact with other participants. To the
extent that lawfinding entails an accurate reconstruction of the enactors' actual intentions, then,
we should conclude that administrative agencies will interpret statutes more accurately than
courts.
Diver, supra note 96, at 575 (omitting footnote citing Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 485-87 (1981)).
105. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
106. Id. at 866.
107. See Pierce, Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statu-
tory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 304, 307 (1988).
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occurred during enactment of the Newspaper Preservation Act. The
phrase "probable danger of financial failure" was not written to give the
Attorney General a policy-making role. Rather, that standard was se-
lected for evaluation of future JOA applications because the House Anti-
trust Subcommittee approved of the Court's prior judicial interpretation
(with no deference to any administrator) of similar language in the Bank
Merger Act.'08 Similarly, the reason the Attorney General was given
authority to approve JOAs was not because opposing sides in a congres-
sional fight were unable to agree on a more definite standard and each
decided to "take its chances" with the Attorney General. Rather, Con-
gress gave the Attorney General a role in the JOA approval process in
order to "sharply restrict[]" the availability of JOAs;' °9 and the "prob-
able danger of financial failure" test was meant to "circumscrib[e] [the
Attorney General's] power to consent through the use of a strict defini-
tion of 'failing newspaper.' ""t Thus, there is apparently no support for
Judge Silberman's claim that Congress "delegated to the Attorney Gen-
eral, not to us, the delicate and troubling responsibility of putting content
into the ambiguous phrase 'probable danger of financial failure.' ""'
Judge Silberman's sole basis for deferring to the Attorney General's
application of "probable danger of financial failure" to the Free Press was
his reading of Chevron for "the principle that the political branches of
government, rather than the judiciary, should make policy choices."' 12
As applied to the Detroit JOA, this argument ignores the reality that the
executive branch alone, and not both political branches of government,
made this policy choice.
Studies have demonstrated how administrative decisions can frus-
trate, rather than further, political compromises that have resulted in
successful legislation. Administrators who oppose a particular bill, or
who are antagonistic to previously passed legislation, can engage in "op-
portunistic behavior" that solely reflects their own policy preferences,
knowing that corrective legislation can be blocked by threat of presiden-
tial veto, or an alliance with a key committee chair or a few members of a
108. 116 CONG. REC. 23,146 (1970) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). Whether or not Repre-
sentative Kastenmeier was correct in stating that the phrase was "well known" and "understood by
the courts in the field," id., his statement clearly demonstrates that Congress did not intend the
phrase to be subject to deferential, policy-oriented construction by the Attorney General. See also
United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 369 (1967) (court, not agency, determines
whether merger meets standard set forth in Bank Merger Act).
109. The Justice Department had opposed the Newspaper Preservation Act. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 33, at 6.
110. 116 CONG. REC. 23,154 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Railsback) (emphasis added).
111. Detroit Newspapers, 868 F.2d at 1297.
Chevron also noted a third possible explanation for statutory ambiguities in that Congress sini-
ply did not consider the question. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984). If the Court really meant to require deference to an agency regardless
of congressional intent and regardless of the applicability of the other general arguments for defer-
ence discussed below, its analysis suffers from the same flaws as Judge Silberman's. But the Court
has not spoken directly on this issue, yet.
112. Detroit Newspapers, 868 F.2d at 1293 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66).
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key panel."1 3 Deference to these decisions hardly furthers Chevron's con-
cern that the political branches should make policy choices. Moreover,
in many cases no reason exists to believe that the political branches of
government agreed that an agency should have broad reign to interpret a
statute as it sees fit. Indeed, the fact that legislators chose a specific stat-
utory standard (in this case, "probable danger of financial failure"), in-
stead of delegating rule-making authority over a particular issue to an
agency, suggests a legislative desire to avoid later administrative revision
of a carefully negotiated legislative outcome." 4
In sum, Judge Silberman's opinion in Detroit Newspapers represents
the most extreme form of deference to an administrator's interpretation
of a statute. Once Silberman was unable to resolve the case by looking to
the plain meaning of the statute or evidence that Congress had specifi-
cally considered the question before him, he chose to defer to the Attor-
ney General's opinion without considering any of the other standard
interpretive tools judges use in construing statutes. In fact, each of these
tools suggests the error of the Attorney General's decision to consider a
newspaper in "probable danger of financial failure" when its financial
losses are strategically induced. Judge Silberman's reliance on the
agency's interpretation is all the more extreme because many of the tradi-
tional justifications for deferring to an agency are inapplicable in this
case.
II. THE RECENT TREND TOWARD FRUSTRATION OF CONGRESS
Judge Silberman's opinion in Detroit Newspapers is just one of sev-
eral by Reagan judicial appointees that have had the systematic effect of
making it more difficult for congressional policy preferences to ultimately
prevail. This trend is particularly troublesome in today's political con-
text-a Republican President, a judiciary composed predominantly of
Republican presidential appointees, 1 ' and a Democratic Congress. All
but the most cynical Republican legal realists should be concerned about
doctrines that systematically distort the balance chosen by the voters in
electing legislators and a President of different parties. 16 Yet recent ju-
dicial appointees propose to accomplish this very result in three distinct
ways: (1) by advocating deference to the interpretations Republican ad-
ministrators have given statutes passed by Democratic Congresses, (2)
113. McCubbins/Noll, supra note 91, at 435-40; see also Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 810-11 (1983) (administrative interpreta-
tions more likely to reflect policy preferences of current administration than that of enacting Con-
gress and President).
114. See Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judiciary Process. The Revisionist Role of
the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 730 (1987).
115. See supra note 20.
116. See, e.g., Fritz, Bush's Coattails: At Best, a Bumpy Ride, L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1988, at 20,
col. 1 (political scientists view ticket-splitting as outgrowth of voters' desire to take advantage of
preference for Democratic government management and deliverance of public services and Republi-
can control over national defense and foreign policy matters).
[Vol. 1989
REAGANIST REALISM
suggesting that federal judges (who are more likely than not to be Repub-
lican) interpret statutes in light of their own personal reading of the
"plain meaning" of the statute without reference to the legislative record
(which is more likely to be controlled by Democratic congressional lead-
ers), and (3) calling forth constitutional doctrines that severely limit the
powers of Congress without imposing similar constraints on executive
power. Although each of these three trends may have merit apart from
their partisan consequences, these consequences should be thoroughly
considered before these trends are given full judicial effect.
Unless a judge is persuaded that, as Chevron suggested, Congress
left a statutory term deliberately ambiguous in order to allow the agency
to resolve the issue, 1 7 deference to administrative interpretation of stat-
utes may be inappropriate where the administration and leading congres-
sional sponsors have different policy preferences. Whatever the benefits
of deference, these benefits are seriously undercut in today's context be-
cause such deference effectively gives Republicans two bites at the apple.
First, congressional Democrats must compromise with Republican exec-
utive branch officials in order to enact legislation the President is willing
to sign. But Republicans can still win any policy victories they could not
achieve through political bargaining-unless the Democrats have clearly
protected against it-when a Republican administrator interprets the
statute.
An era of two-party rule' 18 also presents a troublesome context for
increased reliance on the plain meaning of a statute at the expense of
legislative history. Advocates of plain meaning claim that their approach
will decrease the subjectivity of judicial decisions.' '9 However, this claim
is incorrect for most difficult cases. Of course, legislative interpretation
must begin with the language of the statute. 120 But where opposing par-
ties can each make a reasonable argument that the statutory language
supports their position, those who would insist that their own reading of
117. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
118. See supra note 21.
119. See, e.g., Address by Judge Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History, at 13
(delivered between fall 1985 and spring 1986 at various law schools in various forms) (copy on file
with the University of Illinois Law Review) (use of legislative history "substantially increases, rather
than reduces, the scope of judicial discretion"); see also Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2576 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (interpreting statute contrary to
literal language but consistent with purpose, where result not truly absurd, allows judges to "substi-
tute their personal predelictions [sic] for the will of the Congress"). Even some critics of the plain
meaning rule claim that "textualism attempts to prevent the creative judicial lawmaking that can
occur when judges consult legislative materials and the social context of the statute." Aleinikoff,
supra note 88, at 23. Ironically, the movement toward greater use of legislative history was origi-
nally motivated by a desire to limit the ability of Lochner-era judges to construe the "plain meaning"
of the statute to their liking, through the selective use of canons of construction. See Landis, A Note
on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 889-91 (1930).
It is important to note that many of those opposing reliance on legislative history base their
opposition on other arguments as well. See infra note 160.
120. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
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plain meaning is correct are simply incorporating their own values and
preferences into the construction.
Four cases from a recent Supreme Court term provide evidence, al-
beit anecdotal, to support this point. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 121
involved efforts by multinational owners of trademarks to bar the impor-
tation of their products by discount retailers. Justice Brennan read the
plain meaning of the statute, as the phrase was understood when the stat-
ute was enacted in 1930, to favor the discounters. 122 Conversely, Justice
Scalia read the plain language of the statute to favor the trademark
holders. 123
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Commercial Office
Products Co. 124 raised the question whether an employee alleging sex dis-
crimination had filed her complaint in a timely manner. Justice Mar-
shall's majority opinion found the statutory language ambiguous.
Marshall relied on a contextual interpretation and the agency's interpre-
tation of the statute to rule that the complaint could proceed. 125 Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined Justice Stevens in reaching
the contrary conclusion that the statutory language was plain and hence
dictated judgment for the defendant.'26
A limitations period was also at issue in McLaughlin v. Richland
Shoe Co.,127 where the Secretary of Labor sought to prosecute the re-
spondent for failing to pay overtime wages. Justice Stevens, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Ken-
nedy, concluded that the plain language favored the defendant. 128 Jus-
tices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, in dissent, found the relevant
statutory term ambiguous, and would have held that a contextual exami-
nation supported the government.
129
Finally, in Sheridan v. United States,'30 Justice Stevens wrote an
opinion concluding that a disputed provision of the Federal Tort Claims
Act' 3 ' did not bar a tort suit alleging governmental negligence. Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, dis-
sented based on her reading of the plain statutory language.
132
President Reagan's appointees do not always invoke plain meaning
to reach a conservative result. 33 Moreover, in the cases just discussed,
their reading of the plain meaning may well have been correct. Similarly,
121. 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
122. Id. at 1829 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. Id. at 1831 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. 108 S. Ct. 1666 (1988).
125. Id. at 1671.
126. Id. at 1677 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. 108 S. Ct. 1677 (1988).
128. Id. at 1682.
129. Id. at 1683-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130. 108 S. Ct. 2449 (1988).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982).
132. 108 S. Ct. at 2458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
133. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1223
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reference to the legislative history would not necessarily have resulted in
either more enlightenment or less ideological polarization. In fact, con-
sideration of the legislative history might not have changed a single vote
in any of the four cases. These cases should, however, arouse some skep-
ticism concerning the view that greater reliance on plain meaning results
in increased judicial "objectivity."
As several lawyers who have studied literary criticism have ob-
served, "[a] sentence will never mean exactly the same thing to any two
different people or even the same thing to one person on different occa-
sions."' 34 For this reason, scholars of divergent views agree that "statu-
tory interpretation in hard cases involves substantial judicial discretion
and political judgment." '35 Legislative history may be unhelpful in
many instances because the same ambiguities that infect the statute also
affected legislative deliberations. Legislative history may also be manipu-
lated and abused in some cases.' 36 However, legislative history often can
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (joining liberals in agreeing that Immigration and
Naturalization Act's plain language supports respondent's request for asylum).
134. Hutchison & Morgan, The Semiology of Statutes (Book Review), 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
583, 593-94 (1984) (reviewing D. MIERS & A. PAGE, LEGISLATION (1982)).
135. W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 46, at 570 (citing Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179
(1986/87)).
136. Virtually all commentators on this issue have their own favorite stories of abuse. See, e.g.,
W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 46, at 748-50 (noting Judge Norris's reliance in Montana
Wilderness Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., No. 80-3374 (9th Cir. May 14, 1981), vacated, 655
F.2d 951 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982), on a floor statement by Representative Udall
inserted into the Congressional Record, after the bill had already passed); id. at 751-52 (noting
court's refusal in Monterey Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 743 F.2d
589 (7th Cir. 1984), to rely on floor remarks by House sponsor of bill concerning provision of confer-
ence report where House conferees had deferred to the Senate position); Mikva, Reading and Writ-
ing Statutes, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 627, 636-37 (1987) (recounting experience as member of Congress
when Representative Udall assured two opposing colleagues that each of their mutually exclusive
interpretations was correct).
My own contribution to this lore concerns the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15
U.S.C. § 35 (Supp. V 1987), which immunizes cities from suits for money damages for violations of
federal antitrust law. (I served as antitrust counsel to Senator Howard Metzenbaum during this
period.) The Act contains a special section to deal with pending cases against cities, which provides
that the Act will not apply (and thus the suit can continue) unless, after considering "all the circum-
stances," the court determines that the defendant city has shown that it would be "inequitable" for
the case to proceed. Id. § 35(b). The statute specifically directs the court to consider the availability
of alternative relief and the stage of litigation in determining the equities, and further directs that a
jury verdict or subsequent proceeding is "prima facie evidence" that the case should go forward. Id.
When the conference committee met to deliberate on the bill, several of the House conferees, led
by Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois, sought changes in the retroactivity section that would
have made municipal exemptions easier to obtain in pending cases. (A jury had recently assessed a
$29 million verdict against an Illinois city in a nearby congressional district.) Senate conferees re-
jected this proposal. Representative Hyde then proposed changes in the conference report that
would focus courts' attention on factors favorable to cities. Again, the Senate conferees demurred.
House conferees were then presented with the option of accepting Senator Metzenbaum's proposed
langauge or foregoing any language in the report. The House managers accepted the Metzenbaum
language, which featured the two criteria stated in the statute and emphasized that in cases proceed-
ing past a jury verdict, a defendant would need "compelling equities" to get out of the suit. H.R.
REP. No. 1158, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 4627.
Shortly thereafter (it was the penultimate day of the session), the House began consideration of
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shed additional light on a statutory issue. Courts therefore should not
precipitously jettison legislative history.
Neither the cabin of precedent nor consistency constrains a judge
relying on a statute's plain meaning from applying subjective values to
statutory interpretation. Tools of construction such as canons of statu-
tory interpretation or legislative history are "neutral" in the Wechslerian
sense that they constitute rules of decision that transcend the case at
hand.137 A judge who advocates reliance on floor debate in one decision
will be forced to distinguish the next case when seeking to avoid the force
of a floor remark. But each ruling on the "plain meaning" of a statute is
precedential only for interpretations of the same statute or the same
wording of a related law. Judges thus face fewer constraints in choosing
a plain meaning that suits their own preferences.
If judicial advocates of plain meaning propose increased reliance on
their own values and perspectives, what are they forsaking in the pro-
cess? Their main target is judicial use of legislative history, principally
committee reports and the sponsor's floor statements. 138 The narrative
form of committee reports and floor debates can be a more effective way
for Congress to communicate its policy preferences than the phrasing of
a statute.t39 Of course, today these policy preferences will likely reflect
the conference report. During the floor debate, Representative Crane of Illinois and Representative
Hyde engaged in a colloquy concerning the meaning of the retroactivity provision. They both agreed
that courts should consider whether municipal taxpayers would suffer financial harm and whether
the municipality was proceeding under state law. See 130 CONG. REC. H 12,186 (daily ed. Oct. 11,
1984). This was the precise language that the Senate conferees had rejected!
Modern technology being what it is, these proceedings were televised to offices on the Senate
side. Thus, several hours later when the Senate considered the conference report, Senator Metzen-
baum responded to the Hyde-Crane colloquy by noting that their views had been rejected in confer-
ence. Id. at S14,368.
Two courts have directly addressed the precise issue raised by the Hyde-Crane manufacture of
legislative history. One court, correctly, in my view, took note of both the House debate and Senator
Metzenbaum's comments in recognizing that the two criteria stated in the statute were to be given
prime effect, but that the statutory instruction for courts to consider "all the circumstances" made it
appropriate to consider secondarily those enunciated by the Illinois representatives. Miami Int'l
Realty v. Town of Mt. Crested Butte, 607 F. Supp. 448, 452-53 & n.2 (D. Colo. 1985). Although the
defendants in Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 801 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming and incorpo-
rating as its opinion the district court's opinion, 615 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1985)), probably would
have prevailed based solely on the two principal criteria, the court differentiated the primary and
secondary criteria only in its order of consideration, and merely referenced the Metzenbaum floor
statement with a "But see" citation. Id. at 166.
These examples of abuse do not necessarily suggest that legislative history is wholly unreliable.
Rather, several courts have expressed a sensitivity to the problem illustrated by this story by refusing
to credit legislative history where those in the other house do not have an opportunity to respond.
See, e.g., National Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal Serv., 462 U.S. 810, 833
& n.28 (1983); Monterey Coal, 743 F.2d at 589.
137. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17
(1959).
138. See generally authorities cited supra note 16.
139. See Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 386 ("If judges are
to make congressional primacy meaningful, they cannot afford to ignore the obvious tools which
members of Congress use to explain what they are doing and to describe the meaning of the words
used in the statute.")
Legislative history is often reliable because it is the most contemporaneous construction of the
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the Democratic control of the House and the Senate. Thus, a judicial
mode of interpretation that ignores legislative history and relies instead
on each judge's personal reading of the statute's plain meaning will, in
the context of a Republican-appointed judiciary and a Democratic Con-
gress, result in more rulings favoring conservative, Republican policy
preferences as opposed to favoring liberal, Democratic ones."
Although this may suit conservatives with a short-term outlook, the judi-
cial activism of the Warren Court that is so vilified by conservatives to-
day provides an example of the results occurring when judicial policy
preferences are more liberal than congressional policy preferences.
Increased reliance on plain meaning frustrates congressional policy
objectives in another important way. Congressional policy preferences
do not always find their way into the "plain meaning" of a statute.
Given the nature of the legislative process, Congress may not consider
every current possible application of the legislation, and cannot foresee
all future problems. Even where Congress explicitly intends to apply the
legislation to a particular problem in a certain way, the statutory lan-
guage may not fully capture the congressional meaning.41 When these
factors are coupled with the inertia that hinders the passage of legislation
to correct judicial misinterpretations of congressional intent, a court's
insistence that the plain meaning of a statute serve as the sole basis of its
interpretation diminishes Congress's ability to legislate its policy
preferences. 
1 42
A third example of this pattern of judicial efforts to frustrate con-
gressional policy objectives is Justice Scalia's view of the severe constitu-
tional limits on Congress's ability to interfere with executive
prerogatives, as set forth in his dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olson.
14 3
In Morrison, the other eight Justices voted to uphold the constitutionality
of a statute establishing an independent counsel to investigate and prose-
cute high-ranking executive branch officials accused of committing crimi-
statute available. Judicial reliance on legislative history will encourage the use of this history to
record the statute's political and policy context. The political/policy context of a statute is particu-
larly important when a statute involves the resolution of policy disputes between the administration
and its partisan opponents in Congress. Ironically, judicial deference to executive interpretation is
often justified when the executive was involved in the legislative process, see, e.g., Norwegian Nitro-
gen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933), precisely because of the agency's fuller
and more accurate political sense of the situation. See Diver, supra note 96, at 575. Legislative
history can also provide this greater accuracy. See generally Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule
of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 438 (1989).
140. See Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333,
343 (1976) ("Why should the judge be permitted to impose his own reference.., on statutory words
instead of inquiring in the first instance as to the reference of the enactors?").
141. See Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the
Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 899 (1982). See also Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-
A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 664 (1958) (arguing that "interpret[ing] a word in
a statute without knowing the aim of the statute" is impossible).
142. See Note, supra note 141, at 905-06. The commentator also astutely observes that the
"plain meaning" rule contains an inherent bias against government regulation of private affairs. Id.
at 911-12. In contemporary politics, such a bias reflects Republican policy preferences.
143. 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2622 (1988).
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nal offenses. Justice Scalia began the dissent by noting that the "proud
boast of our democracy that we have 'a government of laws and not of
men' is derived from a provision of the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780, which itself is based on a strict separation of powers between the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.' In Scalia's
view, the United States Constitution has incorporated this concept:
when article II provides that "[tjhe executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States," 4 "this does not mean some of the exec-
utive power, but all of the executive power."' 4 6 Accordingly, once Jus-
tice Scalia determined that the independent counsel's duties involved the
exercise of purely executive power and that the President did not enjoy
exclusive control over that power, he would have found the statute
unconstitutional. 147
Justice Scalia's wall of separated powers is really a one-way mirror.
Once he concludes that a function is properly characterized as "execu-
tive," the President's exercise of that function may not be circumscribed.
In contrast, he would permit the delegation of legislative power to execu-
tive branch officials, apparently endorsing the established constitutional
doctrines permitting such delegations as long as the standard is "intelligi-
ble"-which includes as vague a standard as "the public interest."' 48
Scalia does not seem to believe that once a function is determined to be
legislative, only Congress can perform the function.
In applying the wall of separation to protect the executive from con-
gressional incursions, Scalia's standard is not only strict in theory, but
also strict in application. Thus, Scalia is quick to find that the
prosecutorial function is "purely executive."'' 49  A strong case can be
made, though, that the Constitution expressly provides for legislative
control over prosecutors,15 0 and substantial historical evidence refutes
144. Justice Scalia's opinion sets forth the full quotation from Part the First, Article XXX:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the
executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative
and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and execu-
tive powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a government of laws, and not of men.
Id.
145. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
146. 108 S. Ct. at 2626 (emphasis in original).
147. Id.
148. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 677 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
cited with approval National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943), which
upheld the delegation of authority to the FCC under such a standard, and J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928), which established the deferential "intelligible principle"
doctrine for judicial review of delegation. See also Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1382-
89 (D.D.C.) (per curiam decision of Scalia, Johnson & Gasch, JJ.) (rejecting claim that Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative power), aff'd sub noma. Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). There may be reasons, not provided by Justice Scalia, to justify the
disparate treatment of delegations of executive and legislative power. See infra note 161.
149. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2626-27 ("[g]overnmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is
a quintessentially executive function").
150. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 530-34 (D.C. Cir.) (R.B. Ginsburg, J., dissenting),
rev'd sub noma. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
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Scalia's argument 5' that prosecution has always been an executive func-
tion, beyond control by other branches of government.' Scalia is more
flexible, however, on the permeability of the wall of separation when it
comes to legislative functions. Delegation of legislative authority to exec-
utive branch officials is permissible because, in Scalia's view, "a certain
degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or
judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by the relative specificity or gen-
erality of its statutory commands, to determine-up to a point-how
small or how large that degree shall be."' 5 3
Under Justice Scalia's analysis, then, the Constitution requires that
the delegation of any executive function be subject to complete and total
presidential review and control. However, Congress can lawfully dele-
gate to the President the power, for example, to "issue such orders and
regulations as he deems appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and
salaries,"' 54 and Congress may not alter or withdraw that delegation by
any means short of legislation, subject, of course, to presidential veto.' 55
Justice Scalia's one-way mirror has a clear effect on the outcome of
profound disputes about policy preferences between Democratic Con-
gresses and Republican Presidents: it systematically favors the latter
over the former. For example, legislative vetoes provide Congress with
flexibility that may be desirable in legislating but at the same time pro-
tects against later administrative decisions that are not faithful to the
political compromises made during legislative deliberations. Without
such protection, Congress faces the dilemma of either allowing the execu-
tive free reign to impose its own policy preferences in areas where legisla-
tion cannot foresee specific problems, or so restricting the legislation that
the federal government will be unable to respond quickly to unantici-
pated future events.
Similarly, the use of independent officials to carry out important
governmental tasks is important when a Democratic Congress does not
trust a Republican executive to carry these tasks out faithfully in accord-
ance with the Congress's policy preferences. Unlike the dilemma faced
with legislative vetoes, however, adoption of Justice Scalia's views in
cases such as Morrison v. Olson would inevitably result in wholesale dele-
gation from Congress to the executive branch. If high-level corruption
can constitutionally be prosecuted only with the Attorney General's au-
thorization, or if the only means of regulating industries is by providing
151. See Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2626 (prosecutorial function "has always, and everywhere...
been conducted never by the legislature, never by the courts, and always by the executive").
152. See Bradley, Law Enforcement and the Separation of Powers, 30 ARIz. L. REV. 801 (1988).
153. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 678 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1386 (D.D.C.) (citing Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 745, 763 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986)).
155. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Consumer Energy
Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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that regulatory commissioners serve at the pleasure of the President, 56
Congress will surely choose to delegate.
In the past few years, President Reagan's judicial appointees have
used several doctrines governing congressional interaction with the Presi-
dent to adopt new and relatively extreme positions: extremely broad def-
erence to administrative interpretations of statutes, extreme reluctance to
divine congressional intent from sources controlled by congressional
leaders, and extremely strict limits on Congress's ability to legislate in
areas of "executive" prerogative. The debate concerning the proper bal-
ance between legislative and executive power has been raging since-and
even before-the founding of our Republic.' 57 But when the Framers
debated such issues, they did not envision a two-party system and cer-
tainly not one where the President's party did not control Congress. The
timing of this judicial effort to shift power from Congress to the Presi-
dent at this particular point in American history should give pause to
those concerned with more than victory for Republican policies.
III. THE HYPOCRISY OF CONGRESSIONAL FRUSTRATION BY
CONSERVATIVES
The point of this article is not to conclusively demonstrate that each
or any of these three trends is wrong. Nor does it suggest that only Rea-
gan appointees support this trend. After all, Judge Silberman was able to
command a majority in Detroit Newspapers by securing the concurrence
of Judge Spottswood Robinson, a Johnson appointee.'5t Indeed, strong
arguments exist to support judicial deference to administrative interpre-
tation of statutes, 59 a preference for statutory interpretation based on a
statute's plain meaning instead of potentially unreliable legislative his-
tory,"6 and the imposition of strict constitutional limits confining Con-
156. Although the Court, in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), ex-
pressly upheld the constitutionality of an independent Federal Trade Commission whose members
the President could not remove at will, Justice Scalia has questioned its continuing validity in light of
the many functions the Commission now performs. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 681. One lower court
has recently upheld the constitutionality of the FTC, relying on Humphrey's Executor. Federal
Trade Comm'n v. American Nat'l Cellular, Inc., 810 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987).
157. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT chs. xi-xiv (T. Peardon ed.
1952); THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
158. Nor should Dean Diver or Professors Dickerson or Strauss, who support many aspects of
these trends, see infra notes 159-61, be accused of attempting to frustrate Democratic policy
preferences.
159. Dean Diver has presented a comprehensive argument for presumptive deference. Diver,
supra note 96. He argues, inter alia, that deference will usually preserve judicial resources, more
accurately reconstruct congressional intent, more accurately predict the nature, magnitude, and inci-
dence of the consequences of each litigant's proffered construction, promote harmony among stat-
utes and policies, and more speedily implement official acts.
Professor Peter Strauss has also argued that deference promotes national uniformity in regula-
tion that could be fragmented by inconsistent judicial review of administrative decisions. Strauss,
One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1118-26 (1987).
160. For a cogent and thoughtful critique of legislative history, see Starr, Observations About the
Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 376-79. The thrust of Judge Starr's critique is that
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gress's official actions to legislation. 1 ' As Part II demonstrates,
legislative history is so prone to abuse and manipulation (see supra note 136), such a time-consuming
endeavor for lawyers and judges, and is in so many cases inconclusive, that ready resort to these
tools is not worth the effort. Professor Reed Dickerson makes a more forceful, although perhaps
overstated, attack on the reliability of legislative history as an accurate measure of legislative intent.
R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 154-62 (1975). The abil-
ity of courts to distinguish reliable from irrelevant morsels of legislative history is made more diffi-
cult because, as Judge James Buckley has observed, directives in legislative history are often made to
agencies, not to courts. The expectation in these directives is not that the agency will suffer a judicial
reversal if its action is inconsistent, but that it will suffer political retribution at the next budget cycle
or other convenient opportunity. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. National Labor Relations
Bd., 814 F.2d 697, 716-17 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J., dissenting).
While these arguments have some merit, there is yet another oft-stated argument against the use
of legislative history that is entirely unpersuasive. That argument, pressed most vigorously by Jus-
tice Scalia, is based on the factual assertion (probably true, from my own experience as a congres-
sional staff member) that only a small minority of elected members of Congress actually read
committee reports or listen to floor debates on most legislation. For example, in Blanchard v. Ber-
geron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 946-47 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting), Justice Scalia suggests that:
[a]s anyone familiar with modem-day drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware,
the [matters at issue in the case] were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his or
her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-
lobbyist ....
(Does Justice Scalia suggest that because law clerks insert many footnotes in judicial opinions on
their own initiative such notations should not be considered authoritative?) Justice Scalia has repub-
lished a Senate floor colloquy designed to show that senators do not read committee reports and
therefore, these reports should not have any effect on interpretation. See Hirschey v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 n. I (D.C. Cir. 1985). The republication has caused considera-
ble judicial and academic attention. See, e.g., Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559-60 n.2
(9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the judgment, citing with approval); W. ESKRIDGE & P.
FRICKEY, supra note 46, at 715-16; Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REV. 423, 439-41 n.60 (1988) (citing more extensive quotation from same Senate colloquy in arguing
that the senators did not mean to diminish legislative history as Justice Scalia suggested).
Justice Scalia's argument fails because it proves too much and too little. It proves too much
because anyone familiar with the modem-day drafting of statutes is well aware that committee staff-
ers insert virtually all statutory text, often at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist, and that members
rarely read the text. For all bills but the most major and controversial, the majority of members who
vote on amendments or a bill's final passage base their votes on the fact that another member (usu-
ally a committee member of the same party or ideology) has endorsed the bill. The few key mem-
bers, upon whose judgment the majority rely, are either familiar with the committee reports or have
entrusted one of their own staff members to review them. If the material in reports was unaccept-
able, it would not remain. Where lawyer-lobbyists succeed in securing the insertion of favorable
material in committee reports, it is often because a member, not a staffer, has made a determination
that he or she will support whatever details the particular special interest desires. Unless courts wish
to overhaul the entire operation of Congress to make it fit what judges believe is a more legitimate
way of legislating, legislative history continues to serve as a reliable and legitimate source for statu-
tory interpretation, accord Farber & Frickey, supra, assuming that continued judicial and academic
writings provide courts with tools to sufficiently distinguish the wheat from the chaff. Cf Starr,
supra.
161. Professor Peter Strauss presents a forceful argument that the process by which competing
legislative factions might "take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency[,]" Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984), and then preserve
a one-house or one-committee veto, will exacerbate covert and ex parte contacts and create a disin-
centive for Congress to fulfill its prime responsibility of resolving policy conflicts in the context of
concrete legislation. See Strauss, supra note 139, at 449-51.
My critique of Justice Scalia's wall of separation as a "one-way mirror," see supra text following
note 147, may also be somewhat unfair. My colleague Don Dripps points out that when Congress
delegates legislative power to the executive, it is giving up its own power; when it delegates executive
power elsewhere, it is giving up the power only the President should be able to delegate. Justice
Scalia, however, does not rely on this insight, appearing to favor, in the context of encroachment of
presidential prerogatives, a more pristine wall of separation. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2622.
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however, these trends have adverse consequences in an era when different
political parties control the presidency and Congress. Insufficient atten-
tion has been given to these adverse consequences in weighing the wis-
dom of these trends. The pattern is even more disturbing when one
considers the source--conservative Republican judges-because, in all
three instances, a conservative who did not know the current partisan
makeup of the three branches of the federal government would be ex-
pected to reach the opposite result.
First, Chevron's rule of deference to an agency's interpretation of
legislation, as applied by Judge Silberman in Detroit Newspapers, gives
greater power to unelected bureaucrats. Although the Attorney General
in Detroit Newspapers happened to rule against government intervention,
bureaucrats generally interpret statutes to expand their own power and
pursue their own agendas.1 62 Thus, when partisan control was not at
issue, populist and conservative legislators opposed deference to adminis-
trative interpretations, while liberals supported deference. The high
point of this conservative effort came in 1979 when the Senate approved
the so-called Bumpers Amendment, which overturned the practice of ju-
dicial deference to administrative agencies.1 63 Leading the fight against
the Bumpers Amendment was Senator Edward Kennedy."6
Conservatives also tend to strongly support free markets and, in
other contexts, have warmly embraced the law and economics move-
162. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. 23,483 (1979) (statement of Sen. Domenici) ("[i]n this age of
overregulation,... the bureaucracy has consistently thwarted the will of Congress by drafting regu-
lations that go far beyond congressional intent"); id. at 23,498 (statement of Sen. Exon) ("[t]he
people of this Nation are demanding that the Congress take action to make the Federal bureaucracy
accountable to both the Congress and the people").
163. Technically, the Senate rejected a motion to table (kill) the proposal, which was offered as
an amendment to S. 1477, the Federal Courts Improvements Act. Id. at 23,499. The amendment
provided that courts reviewing administrative regulations shall "interpret constitutional and statu-
tory provisions... [with] no presumption that any rule or regulation of any agency is valid .... "
Id. at 23,478. The vote on the motion to table was 27-51. Of the 27 senators who voted to kill the
amendment, all but two (Senators Thad Cochran and Robert Dole) were northern Democrats or
moderate Republicans. See id. at 23,499. (After the Senate passed S. 1477, id. at 30,102, the bill was
referred to the House Judiciary Committee, which took no further action. See Index, 125 CONG.
REC. pt. 29, at 2006 (1979)).
The Senate vote in favor of increased judicial review of agency action is even more remarkable,
in light of today's debates, because the contemporary judicial doctrines the Senate disfavored were
far more modest than the deference that has occurred since Chevron. Judge Carl McGowan noted
that he saw nothing in the amendment that "would stop me or any other judge from going about our
interpretive job the way we always have." C. McGowan, Remarks to the Section of Administrative
Law, Ass'n of Am. Law Schools 7 (Jan. 4, 1981) (quoted in Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial Activism: A
"Liberal" or "Conservative" Technique?, 15 GA. L. REV. 539, 552 n.72 (1981)). Perhaps this obser-
vation was based upon the contemporary view of judges of the District of Columbia Circuit that
deference was required when special administrative expertise is actually present or when Congress
has acquiesced in an administrative determination actually brought to its attention. See Action on
Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 660 F.2d 773, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (court, in an
opinion by Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, explained why deference is inappropriate), rev'd, 454 U.S.
27 (1981).
164. 125 CONG. REC. 23,481-85 (1979).
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ment.t 65 Law and economics scholars have argued that legislation repre-
sents a bargain among special interests, and that the legislative process
works best when courts enforce the bargain according to its terms.
1 66
Deference gives administrators an opportunity to upset legislative bar-
gains, 167 and thus renders the legislative "market" less reliable.
Second, increased reliance on each judge's personal reading of the
"plain meaning" of a statute allows judges to invoke their own views
rather than interpreting the statute consistent with legislative intent.
1 61
Yet conservatives favor judicial restraint, not judicial activism, and are
sharply critical of judges who fail to give effect to the will of the demo-
cratically elected branches of government.169 In the constitutional area,
for example, conservatives support an interpretation based on "original
intent," as revealed by historical material, and decry interpretation based
on a Justice's personal view of the meaning of broad constitutional
text. 170 The use of plain meaning, then, results in greater judicial "activ-
ism," with judges applying their own values to resolve cases, and less
judicial "restraint," with judicial restraint defined as courts enforcing
congressional value choices as expressed in the legislative history.' 7 '
Finally, the principal nonpartisan effect of legislative vetoes and
other flexible means that affect the separation of powers is to limit gov-
ernment regulation, and to increase the areas controlled by politically
accountable elected representatives. Indeed, when partisanship was not
an issue, liberal public interest groups, not conservatives, led the fight
against legislative vetoes.'
72
The many conservatives who find economic models of behavior at-
tractive 73 would also recognize, partisan bias aside, that congressional
165. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 19, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. ch.6
(1985) (advocating free market for corporate control); EONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT,
H.R. Doc. No. 123, 97 Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1982) (noting reform of antitrust policies by Justice
Department and Federal Trade Commission to promote economic efficiency, and "major effort to
emphasize the use of benefit-cost analysis in regulation").
166. See, e.g., Easterbrook/Chicago, supra note 85, at 540, 547.
167. See supra text accompanying note 91.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 119-40.
169.. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Robert
H. Bork to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 60-61
(1988) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
170. See Strauss, supra note 139, at 436 n.30.
171. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 160, at 459 (ignoring indicia of congressional intent
removes judicial role as honest agent of Congress). For a masterful analysis of the judicial activism
inherent in the plain meaning rule, see Aleinikoff, supra note 88, at 31-32 (1988). Aleinikoff does not
go quite far enough, however. He concludes that the new trend toward reliance on plain meaning
"turns out not to be a theory dedicated to or grounded on legislative supremacy," but rather "a
political strategy for.disciplining both judges and legislators." Id. at 32. He is correct about legisla-
tors, but fails to explain how judges' power to construe statutes based on their own personal view of
plain meaning is a form of discipline or restraint.
172. Alan Morrison, of Ralph Nader's Public Citizen group, challenged the legislative vetoes in
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923 (1983), and Consumer Energy
Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
173. See supra note 165.
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delegation of tasks to executive branch officials is often necessary, but*
such delegation creates principal-agent problems, 74 and that legislative
vetoes are very useful ways of solving these problems. Yet the model of
strict separation of powers provides no room to maneuver.
IV. CONCLUSION
In affirming Attorney General Edwin Meese's approval of a Joint
Operating Agreement between Detroit's two rival newspapers, Judge Sil-
berman's opinion in Detroit Newspapers rode roughshod over every ac-
cepted tool of statutory construction except one-deference to Meese's
interpretation of the statutory standard he was required to apply. The
court of appeals chose to defer to the Attorney General although every
other major tool of statutory construction suggested that his decision was
incorrect-and even though the major reasons generally supporting def-
erence to an administrator's statutory interpretation were inapplicable to
Meese's decision.
Unfortunately, Judge Silberman's decision is not merely an isolated
error. Rather, it is part of a pattern of opinions written by Reagan judi-
cial appointees that have the systematic effect of elevating policy prefer-
ences of the Republicans, who control the presidency and are gaining
increasing control over the judiciary, over those of the Democrats who
control Congress. Before proceeding further to embrace extreme defer-
ence to an agency's statutory interpretation, reliance on a judge's per-
sonal view of the plain meaning of a statute while ignoring the relevant
legislative history, and a constitutional theory that erects strict limits on
Congress's ability to interact with executive branch officials to *hom it
has delegated important responsibilities, judges whose mission is not
solely to elevate Republican policy preferences should pause to consider
the consequences of these trends in light of the continued split in partisan
control of the two elected branches of government. A healthy skepticism
toward this trend is particularly justified when one considers that con-
servative Republicans who are not motivated by short-term partisan con-
cerns would be expected to oppose deference to administrators, reliance
on judges' personal views to decide statutory questions, and limits on the
ability of Congress to rein in appointed government regulators. Accord-
ingly, the continued use of legislative history in cases requiring statutory
interpretation 75 and the continued isolation of Justice Scalia among the
174. See McCubbins/Noll, supra note 91, at 433-34.
175. See Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court
Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195 (1983). Each Justice (other than Justice Scalia) has used legislative
history for authoritative support in a recent opinion. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397,
2403 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2310
(1989) (White, J.); California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2228, 2234
(1989) (Stevens, J.); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136, 2144 (1989) (Marshall, J.); Man-
sell v. Mansell, 109 S. Ct. 2023, 2032 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Davis v. Michigan Dep't of
Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1500, 1506 (1989) (Kennedy, J.); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Ship-
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Justices on separation of powers questions' 76 are important steps toward
postponing the day when it can be said not only that "all law is poli-
tics,"' 7 7 but also that all politics is a short-term partisan power play. The
Supreme Court, however, has not yet spoken dispositively.'78
ping Corp., 109 S. Ct. 683, 688 n.3, 692 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J.); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell,
456 U.S. 512, 523 (1982) (Blackmun, J.).
176. No other Justice joined Justice Scalia's opinions in Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2622,
and Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. at 677.
177. Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Confer-
ence on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391, 411 (1984) ("in a phrase, LAW IS POLITICS,
pure and simple"); see also Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 540 (1988) (critical
legal scholars "insist that law is a form of politics").
178. 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd per curiam, No. 88-1640 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1989) (appeals
court affirmed by a 4-4 vote).
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